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1. Introduction 
 
China, as one of the world’s largest economies and the world’s biggest carbon emitter, is deeply 
connected with global energy markets and energy governance systems. The impacts of China’s 
electricity generation and consumption extend far beyond its national borders, given that it 
represents 27% of world power generation and China’s electricity sector is responsible for 
around 8% of global greenhouse gas emissions (Pollitt, 2020). China’s prominent role in the global 
energy value chain and carbon emission schemes underlines the significance of understanding 
China’s domestic energy regulations and its market development. 
 
China is reforming its electricity supply sector under the guidance of the No.9 document of 2015 
(China Communist Party and China State Council, 2015). After five years of reform, a Draft Energy 
Law of the People's Republic of China (hereafter referred as the Energy Law for convenience) has 
been published for public consultation in April 2020. Unlike other successful jurisdictions whose 
electricity reforms are underpinned by law, it is a tradition for China to publish a policy document 
first to set the scene for the reform plan and then enact or amend the relevant law to accommodate 
the reform plan. Due to the huge uncertainty around the course of reform, it seems to make sense 
to roll out a policy document without strong legal force to find out whether the reform plan is 
feasible. If the actual reform progresses well, it is then time for legislative work. However, the 
content of the current Energy Law draft still has some weaknesses in its likelihood of supporting 
a successful electricity reform outcome based on international experience. This paper will review 
these weaknesses from the perspective of modern power market reform and the low carbon 
transition and give relevant advice on potential improvements. 
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This paper contributes to two strands of literature. The first strand of research focuses on China’s 
energy law and the shortcomings in the law and institutional systems (Yu, 2010; Qiu and Li, 2012).  
But this literature solely focuses on the context of the law without consideration of its implication 
for China’s recent electricity reforms. The second strand is the burgeoning literature on China’s 
electricity reform (Andrews-Speed and Dow, 2000; Ma and He, 2008; Xu, 2017; Zhang, et al., 2018; 
Li, et al., 2019; Davidson and Pérez-Arriaga, 2020). This seeks to identify the weaknesses in 
China’s reform plans and gives some advice on improvements. But it rarely considers the legal 
aspects of reform. This paper tries to fill the gap between these two strands of literature. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the background to the 
legislative progress of China’s Energy Law system, compares the new draft to its previous draft 
published in 2007 and to China’s Energy Supply and Consumption Revolution Strategy (2016-
2030). Section 3 identifies weaknesses in the current Energy Law draft and gives some advice on 
possible improvements from the perspective of international electricity reform experience 
summarized in Pollitt, et al. (2017). Section 4 concludes the paper.  
 
 
2. Background of the legislation of China’s Energy Law 
This section will introduce a summary of the Energy Law draft, the legislative history and the 
relationship between the Energy Law and other energy sectoral laws. Comparison of 2007 version 
of the Energy Law draft and the Energy Supply and Consumption Revolution Strategy (2016-2030) 
with the current Energy Law draft is also undertaken to demonstrate the change of priorities in 
the legislative progress. 
 
2.1 Summary of the Energy Law Draft 
   
 




The latest version of the Draft Energy Law1 was published by the National Development and 
Reform Commission (NDRC) and the National Energy Administration (NEA) on April 3rd of 20202. 
The legislation is motivated the new energy security strategy proposed by the China Communist 
Party (CCP) in 2014. The new energy strategy called for the promotion of production revolution, 
consumption revolution, technology revolution, institutional revolution and enhancing 
international cooperation3. The Fourth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee of the CCP 
in 2019 further called for " promoting the energy revolution and building clean, low-carbon, safe 
and efficient energy system ".4 The Energy Law was drafted on these guiding principles of the 
ruling party. As the fundamental legislation of the energy sector, it covered areas such as strategy 
and planning, development and conversion, supply and consumption, the energy market, energy 
security, progress in science and technology, international cooperation, supervision and 
administration. The main contents and elements of the Energy Law are summarized in Table 
1Error! Reference source not found.5. 
 
Table 1 Summary of Key points in Energy Law 
Content Elements  
Chapter I  General The general principles of energy development strategy. 
Chapter II Energy 
Strategy and Planning 
Harmonization of national and regional energy development 
planning; inspection and reviewing of local planning implementation. 
Chapter III   Energy 
Development and 
Processing Conversion 
Section I General 
Fuel mix optimization with low carbon 
generation substitution of carbon 
generation, environment protection. 
Section II Fossil Fuel 
The general principles for fossil fuel 
development such as coal, oil, gas and 
coal-fired power generation. 
 
1 Article 115 gives the legal interpretation of energy: 
‘Energy refers to resources that produce thermal energy, mechanical energy, electrical energy, nuclear energy, and 
chemical energy, mainly including coal, petroleum, natural gas (including shale gas, coalbed methane, bio-natural 
gas, etc.), nuclear energy, hydrogen energy, and wind energy , solar energy, hydroelectric energy, biomass energy, 
geothermal energy, ocean energy, electricity and heat, and other resources that obtain useful energy directly or 
through processing and conversion.’ Thus the Energy Law covers coal, gas, oil and electricity sectors. 
2 Website of China National Energy Administration: http://www.nea.gov.cn/2020-04/10/c_138963212.htm 
3 http://www.xinhuanet.com//politics/2014-06/13/c_1111139161.htm 
4 https://china.huanqiu.com/article/9CaKrnKnC4J 
5 Unofficial English translation from British Embassy in Beijing. 
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Section III Non-Fossil Fuel 
Renewable portfolio standard, nuclear 
development and security. 
Chapter IV   Energy 
Supply and 
Consumption  
Energy infrastructure development; energy firm supply obligation; 
energy-saving and emission reduction obligation of customers. 
Chapter V   Energy 
Market 
Separation of monopoly and competitive business; the market 
development target and price mechanism for different products. 
Chapter VI   Energy 
Security 
Safety protection of energy production facilities; energy reserve 
management and emergency response. 
Chapter VII   Progress 
in Science and 
Technology 
Government support policy for science and technology innovation; 
talent training and public education. 
Chapter 
VIII   International 
Cooperation 
Foreign investment and trade; cross-border infrastructure 
construction; Cooperation in science and technology. 
Chapter 
IX   Supervision and 
Administration 
Administrative licensing and consent for construction schemes; 
supervision of energy supply, open-access of energy pipeline and 
wire. 
Chapter X   Legal 
Liability 
Legal punishment for violation of open access of energy pipeline and 
wire, universal supply and information disclosure obligation. 
Chapter 
XI   Miscellaneous 
Legal Interpretation of Terms; Law Effective Date. 
 
 
2.2 Legislative history of the Energy Law 
 
In the planned economy era, all the energy-related activities were comprehensively regulated by 
administrative directives. There was no need to enact laws for governance in the energy sector. 
When China began its economic reform in 1978, the government started to recognize the critical 
role of energy law in setting the legal relationship between different energy entities. The 
legislative progress of China’s Energy law was set in motion the 1980s. The Ministry of Energy, 
which was founded in 1988, decided to fill the gaps of law in the energy sector as one of its main 
objectives.  
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A special task group was commissioned under the direction of the Ministry of Energy to engage 
in a research project into the China Energy Law System (Wu,2009). This task force proposed that 
there should be an Energy Law as the leading legislation and several sector laws (for coal, oil and 
gas, nuclear, electricity, renewable energy, etc). The Energy Law should serve as the basic law and 
fundamental legislation for the whole energy system. It should guide the strategic direction of the 
energy sector, cover the overall issues faced by all the energy fuel sources and set legal 
fundamentals for the other energy sector laws. The individual energy sector laws only cover their 
specific energy sector and give provisions which only apply to that sector. Besides that, the 
provisions of these energy sector laws should not contradict the basic principles of the overall 
energy law. In the Chinese law system, the energy law works as the stem while the sector laws are 
branches (Zhang and Ye,2006).  
 
The Ministry of Energy and Legislative Office of State Council accepted this proposal, which 
formed the basic structure of China Energy Law System (Ye and Wu,2006). Unfortunately, the 
Ministry of Energy was dismantled into the Ministry of Electricity Power and the Ministry of Coal 
in the 1993 government reshuffle (Luo,1993), and there was no single ministerial agency left in 
charge of implementing the original legislative agenda. Luckily the newly founded Ministry of 
Electricity Power and the Ministry of Coal picked up the legislative task and brought forward the 
Electricity Law and the Coal Law to a vote at the National People’s Congress. These two sectoral 
laws were enacted in 1995 and 1996 respectively. In addition, the Energy Conservation Law was 
drafted by the former National Planning Commission (predecessor of NDRC – National 
Development and Reform Commission) and enacted in 1997. The Renewable Energy Law was 
drafted by the NDRC and enacted in 2005. The structure of China’s Energy Law system is depicted 
in Error! Reference source not found.: 
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Figure 1 China's Energy Law System 
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The Energy Law has not been put aside with the publication of the sectoral laws. Although the 
Ministry of Energy no longer exists, the National Energy Affairs Leading Group chaired by Premier 
Wen Jiabao was set up in 2005, which also engaged in the drafting of an Energy Law. In 2007, the 
first version of Energy Law draft was posted online for public consultation 6 . Thousands of 
 
6 The public consultation website in Chinese is: http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2007-12/04/content_824569.htm 
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opinions were proposed by various stakeholders. Unfortunately, there was a vast range of 
disagreements among academics and relevant government agencies. 
 
For example, one of the controversies was how to describe the government’s energy governance 
structure. China did not have a Ministry of Energy from 1992 onwards. Even the National Energy 
Administration (NEA) did not have full administrative authority over the entire energy sector(Lin 
and Purra, 2019). Administrative authority was dispersed over different ministries (e.g. National 
Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Land and Natural Resource, Ministry of 
Environment Protection, etc) (Tan and Zhao,2016). There were disagreements on whether the 
government should set up a unified ministerial energy authority or keep the status quo (Lv,2014).  
Another disagreement was whether to set up an independent energy regulatory agency. Some 
thought it necessary while others thought the regulatory agency should be one branch of an 
energy administrative department (Lv,2014). 
 
Confronted with so many disagreements around the Energy Law draft, the Legislative Office of 
the State Council found it was not an appropriate time to push the law forward. So, the legislative 
progress was left pending. After another round of government agency restructuring in 2013, the 
newly formed National Energy Administration (NEA) decided to pick up the stalled legislative 
progress and commissioned several research projects to solve the issue around the Energy Law. 
Given that the No.9 document – promoting power market reform - was published in 2015, the 
latest draft of the Energy Law, incorporating the content of No.9 document has now been 
published for open consultation. 
 
2.3 Differences between the Draft Energy Law of 2020 and its previous version 
 
Compared with the Draft Energy Law of 2007, the overall content of the 2020 version has been 
reduced from the original 15 chapters and 140 articles to 11 chapters and 117 articles. Similar to 
   
 
   
 
9
its previous version, the 2020 Draft covers almost every aspect of energy policy, long-term 
planning and administration. The greatest change in content is in policy priorities. The 2007 Draft 
contained separate chapters on energy conservation, energy development in rural area, energy 
reserves and energy emergency response. These topics were high priorities at that time. The 2020 
Draft breaks up the content of these chapters and places them in various chapters. The clauses on 
energy conservation and energy development in rural areas are dispersed throughout the whole 
text of the 2020 version, and a new chapter is devoted to energy security, including the conditions 
under which energy reserves can be used. A further feature of the 2020 Draft is the higher priority 
given to renewable energy, the environment and ecological protection. The 2020 version is more 
in line with the response to climate change, and the focus has shifted to the optimization of the 
energy mix prioritising non-fossil energy.7 However, there are still some issues that need to be 
clarified in the 2020 version. 
 
First of all, China has not determined to establish a ministerial department under the State Council 
to oversee the energy sector. Chapter II of the 2007 draft formulates the function and 
responsibility of a central energy administrator. As aforementioned, there were controversies 
about whether China should establish a unified ministerial energy authority following this. As a 
result, Chapter II of the 2007 draft is removed in the 2020 version with some provisions going 
into other chapters. There are still no clear statements about what specific government agencies 
should do. In other words, although it says that some issues are very important to the country and 
need to be done, there is no statement about who – within government - should be responsible 
for them.  
Article 44 8  proposes the formulation of a national medium-term and long-term target for 
renewable energy development and utilization, and a target for the proportion of renewable 
 
7 See an interesting post from Philip Andrews-Speed (2020) who discusses the differences in topics between the 
2007 and 2020 drafts: http://www.andrewsspeed.com/chinas-recent-energy-market-reforms-will-
underperform/ 
8 This article is as follows: 
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energy in national energy consumption. However, the article does not define priorities for 
different generation forms, nor does it provide specific target indicators, so these kinds of targets 
look hard to put into practice.  
 
At the same time, a new chapter on energy security has been added to this draft. This chapter 
further clarifies issues such as energy emergency supply and energy reserves and requires 
measures to ensure the future emergency response capacity of the energy sector and to improve 
the reliability of energy supply. However, compared to the previous version, the new draft says 
less about energy conservation, rural energy, energy prices and taxation. This could be a signal 
that the government will put less emphasis on these issues in the coming years.  
 
The relevant articles also reflect changes in the technological development of the energy sector. 
The focus of this draft pays much more attention to balancing the development of fossil energy 
and non-fossil energy. As a result, the arrangement of the chapters is more concerned with 
promoting non-fossil fuel energy use. Generally speaking, the content of the draft is more concise, 
and the responsible people stipulated in the articles are at or above the county level, which 
enhances the likely effect of the articles on energy activities.  
 
2.4 Comparisons of the Draft Energy Law and related laws on electricity reform 
 
The rounds of electricity reform in 20029 and 2015 are two recent milestones for China’s market-
oriented electricity reform. The statements in the Draft Energy Law and related laws may reflect 
these reform guidelines to some extent. Table 2 compares market statements in the Draft Energy 
 
‘The country takes renewable energy as a priority area for energy development, and formulates a national long-term 
target for aggregate renewable energy development and its proportion in primary energy consumption. The country 
includes the target as binding indicators in the national economic and social development plans for long-term and 
every year. This target will be decomposed into local government’s (various provinces, autonomous regions and 
municipalities) plan for implementation. The energy department of the State Council, together with the relevant 
departments of the State Council, monitors the implementation progress of local government (various provinces, 
autonomous regions, and municipalities) and conducts annual assessments.’ 
9 See China State Council (2002). 
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Law to the Energy Supply and Consumption Revolution Strategy (2016-2030) published by the 
NEA in 201610. 
 
Table 2 Amendments about energy market reform in the Draft Energy Law11 
Content Energy Law Draft 2020 Energy Supply and Consumption 






Give play to the decisive role of the 
market in the allocation of 
resources; 
Form a mechanism in the 
competitive field where the market 
determines energy prices; and 
establishing an effective energy 
regulatory system; 
Legitimate rights and interests of 
investors should be protected by 
law. 
Paragraph 3, section 2, Chapter 2.   
Give the market the decisive role in 
resource allocation; 
Highlight the dominant role of market 
players in promoting the energy 
revolution; improve laws and 
regulations in maintaining market 
order;  promote the modernization of 




Article 65  
Promotes the construction of 
energy markets such as coal, 
electricity, oil, and natural gas; 
Promote the establishment of 
energy market trading institutions 
or trading platforms with complete 
functions, independent operations 
and standardized operations. 
Encourages the development of 
various effective trading methods 
and trading varieties. 
Paragraph 1, Chapter 6 
Accelerate the construction of a unified 
and open market system with the 
orderly competition; 
With the goal of saving, diversification 
and high efficiency, the state will 
innovate the macro-control 
mechanism of energy; 
 
Build a system and mechanism to 
encourage innovation in constructing 
the fast lane of energy development. 
Price 
mechanism 
Article 66  
Energy prices mainly determined 
by factors such as the status of 
energy resources, market supply 
and demand, environmental costs, 
and inter-generational fairness and 
sustainability. 
Paragraph 1, section 2, Chapter 6 
The energy price mechanism 
determined by factors such as the 
scarcity of energy resources, the 
relationship between market supply 
and demand, environmental 
 
10 http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2017-04/25/content_5230568.htm 
11 The text of the Draft Energy Law of 2020 is from the unofficial English translation from British Embassy in 
Beijing while the text of the Energy Supply and Consumption Revolution Strategy (2016-2030) is a translation by 
the authors of the original Chinese version, which is published on 29th December, 2016 by NDRC and NEA. 
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The price of the natural monopoly 
link is managed by the competent 
price department. The authority 
and scope of the government to set 
energy prices are based on central 
and local pricing catalogues. 
compensation costs, and inter-
generational equity and sustainability.  
Establish a price mechanism mainly 
determined by the market.  
Strengthen the supervision of market 






Article 67  
The competent price department 
conducts and review energy price 
supervision in accordance with 
regulations. 
Energy companies should provide 
price cost data in accordance with 
the requirements of the competent 
price department and accept price 
cost supervision.  
The competent price department 
formulate and adjust energy prices. 
Paragraph 2, section 2, Chapter 6 
Strengthen the supervision, review 
government pricing costs and promote 
openness and transparency of pricing 
mechanism.  
Improve the government's price 
supervision system in some important 
fields.  
Implement and improve the linkage 
mechanism to ensure the basic energy 




Article 68  
Promote the development of the 
energy market, rationally arrange 
trading institutions and trading 
platforms, and guide the 
formulation of energy market 
setting plans and market rules. 
Paragraph 2, section 1, Chapter 6 
Reduce the intervention of the 
government in the energy market, the 
direct allocation in energy resources 




Article 69  
Strengthen supervision of the 
energy market operation order and 
natural monopoly links, and 
regulate and maintain fair 
competition in the energy market 
order. 
Paragraph 2, section 1, Chapter 6 
Break regional blockades and industry 
monopolies, strengthen market price 
supervision,  investigate and publish 
the monopoly activities of market 
dominance and administrative power. 
 
Compared with the Energy Supply and Consumption Revolution Strategy (2016-2020), the Draft 
Energy Law discusses energy markets in independent chapters, drawing on the experience of 
international legislation and reflecting greater generality, comprehensiveness and time-
sensitivity. The purpose of the Draft Energy Law is to adjust the energy structure, promote energy 
development, and clarify the direction of energy market-oriented reform. The Draft Energy Law 
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lays the legal foundation for the energy market reform and emphasizes its dominant position in 
framing the future energy system. It introduces market competition and removes some 
restrictions on private capital. The Draft Energy Law establishes a renewable energy consumption 
guarantee system, which may promote the development of renewable energy to a large extent.  
 
 
3. Suggestions for improvements to China’s Energy Law system 
based on lessons from international electricity liberalization 
Article 14 of the Energy Law draft sets out the basic principle that the State insists on the decisive 
role of the market in resource allocation and in promoting competition. Compared to the 2007 
draft, one of the significant amendments of the 2020 version is adding a new chapter entitled 
‘Energy Market’. There are 6 articles covering market participants, market development targets 
and content, the price formation mechanism and price regulation. These provisions can provide 
legal support for power market reform. Several articles in other chapters also make provisions on 
renewable energy development and grid connections. This section will discuss these articles 
related to the 14 reform elements indicated in Pollitt et al. (2017) highlighted in bold and italic 
below and ask what the draft law indicates about these reform elements12. The numbers in bold 
follow the numbering in Pollitt et al. (2017).  We do this because it is important to know the 
potential room for improvement in the Energy Law. 
 
Because the Energy Law draft works as the leading legislation concerning the common issues in 
the whole energy field, many of its provisions are not specific to the electricity supply industry. 
Meanwhile, the Electricity Law was enacted in 1995 with provisions covering general rules on 
 
12 Elements 1,2,8 and 5,6 from Pollitt et al. (2017) are merged here due to similarity reasons. So the following 
header numbers are not consecutive. 
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electricity, electricity construction projects, power generation and grid operation, power supply 
and consumption, electricity tariffs, rural electricity development and consumption, and 
electricity facility protection. However there are no provisions on the power market reform. The 
Energy Law draft will serve as a guide for a future amendment of the Electricity Law.  This section 
will, therefore, put forward some suggestions for a future revision of Electricity Law based on the 
current proposals in the Energy Law draft. 
 
(1-2,8) vertical separation of competitive elements (generation and retail) from natural 
monopoly networks; sufficient horizontal restructuring of generation to create a competitive 
wholesale market; unbundling of regulated network charges and competitive segment 
charges. 
 
Differing minimal efficient size in each segment of the electricity sector justifies the separation of 
competitive elements from natural monopoly business and the creation of a competitive 
wholesale generation market. The EU directives (1996, 2003 and 2009) proposed various kinds 
of unbundling of network businesses from the vertically integrated firm with ownership 
unbundling preferred in the European single electricity market (Pollitt, 2008). Many individual 
European states also require investor-owned utilities to divest their generation assets (Pollitt, 
2019). To create a competitive wholesale market, there should be a sufficient number of 
generators so that none of them can persistently set the market price. The duopolists in the early 
wholesale market of England and Wales, who enjoyed substantial market power, impeded market 
efficiency (Green and Newbery, 1992). 
 
After vertical unbundling, prices for wholesale and final retail charges can be competitively 
determined, while distribution and transmission charges continue to be regulated. The 
introduction of incentive regulation involving RPI-X regulation of the revenue of network 
companies has resulted in very significant improvements in the efficiency of operation (Jamasb 
and Pollitt, 2007). 
   
 




This first element is echoed in Article 64 ‘Natural monopoly businesses and competitive businesses 
in the energy sector should be operated separately…’. 
 
For the electricity sector, more specific provision may include separation of the retail business 
from the distribution business of the grid company. Before the issuing of the No.9 document in 
2015, China’s two main Grid companies had 98% of the customers in the retail market (Liu, et al., 
2019). If retail competition is opened up, the incumbent network-retailers could cross-subsidize 
their retail business from their regulated network cost allowances. That may impede future retail 
competition. Since retailing and distribution are two different kinds of business, there is no need 
to continue with an integrated business model. The Energy Law has set up a good principle 
dealing with the boundary between competition and monopoly elements of the electricity 
sector, but this needs further clarification, especially for the electricity industry.  A new 
Electricity Law should make specific provisions for unbundling the transmission, 
distribution and retail businesses of the Grid companies.  
 
However, on the second element, the Energy Law remains silent on horizontal market structure. 
In the first round of reform in 2002, the generation assets of the vertically integrated State Power 
Corporation of China was nearly equally divided into five generators. In 2015, China Power 
Investment Corp, one of the big five, merged with State Nuclear Power Technology Corp to form 
State Power Investment Corp13. In 2017, China Guodian Corporation, another big five, merged 
with Shenhua Group who was China’s largest coal producers and one of the largest coal generators 
outside the big five14. These two mergers substantially increased wholesale market concentration 
in some provincial markets.  Because they are all state-owned-enterprises, the merger decision 
was made by their legal owner, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
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Antimonopoly Law. From international experience, a competitive horizontal structure is vital for 
the success of electricity reform. China has already enacted the Antimonopoly Law in 2007 which 
was aimed at strengthening merger scrutiny. The Energy Law needs to include the provision to 
coordinate with the Antimonopoly Law on market competition.  
The Energy Law needs to set the principle that a competitive market structure should be 
created and sustained throughout the whole reform process. Any proposed merger should 
be subject to strict scrutiny under the Antimonopoly Law to make sure that it will not 
hinder future competition. 
 
This last element is echoed in Article 66 of the Energy Law draft which states that the prices of 
the competitive segments should be determined by the market, while the natural monopoly 
charge is set by the relevant government agency. Nonetheless, the current natural monopoly price 
regulation is largely cost plus oriented which is reflected by Article 67 ‘Price Cost Supervision and 
Examination’. For China to bring itself in line with international best practice, there must be strict 
accounting and legal separation of transmission, distribution and retail businesses. An obvious 
way forward is for the responsible regulatory agency to compare distribution and transmission 
costs at the provincial level and use benchmarking methods to set the efficient level of revenue 
for the transmission and distribution sectors. In line with the unbundling of transmission, 
distribution and retail businesses, it is worthwhile setting out the principle of incentive 
regulation in the Energy Law. 
 
(3) the creation of wide area independent system operators. 
The creation of independent system operators and merit-order based dispatch is key to achieving 
substantial savings in the power system. The system operator plays an indispensable role in 
balancing the power generation and load in real-time. Since all the resources in the power system 
must follow the system operator’s direction, the system operator should be independent of 
generators or retailers to maintain impartiality. The system operators in different jurisdictions 
may adopt different dispatch regimes such as cost-based dIspatch, bid-based dIspatch and self-
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dIspatch (Sioshansi and Pfaffenberger, 2006). A common feature of these dispatch regimes is to 
let the least cost plants be dispatched first. Meanwhile, the extension of single system operation 
control to a wider area can achieve substantial benefits (Mansur and White, 2012). 
 
There is no related provision on this in the Energy Law draft due to it being specific to the 
electricity sector. Only Article 18 emphasises that the state adopts various methods to ensure 
energy conservation and efficient development and utilization. Article 18 of the current Electricity 
Law also states that power generation and grid operation should follow the principles of security, 
high-quality and economic operation. The current default equal share dispatch regime (see Pollitt 
et al., 2017) does not support efficient system operation and weakens the competition among 
generators. The advantage of merit order dispatch is that it underpins competition between 
power plants by massively sharpening incentives to reduce operating costs for individual plants 
to be dispatched with higher probability. We hope there will be provisions in the future 
amendment of Electricity Law to legally underpin a comprehensive move towards merit 
order based economic dispatch. 
 
China currently has five tiers dispatch hierarchy ranging from national, regional, provincial, 
prefectural and county levels15. But dispatch is largely organized at the provincial level with some 
higher-level interprovincial bulk power flows. Interprovincial electricity trading has kept growing 
as power market reform has progressed. As one of the active regional markets, the bulk power 
flow from the western to eastern provinces (e.g. Yunnan to Guangdong) within the China Southern 
Grid has increased by 4.1% to 226.5 TWh in 201916. Interprovincial power trading can both 
reduce overall electricity costs and carbon emissions. Unfortunately, the Energy Law is silent on 
this topic. Article 22 of the current Electricity Law merely states that the state encourages the 
 
15 The Power Grid Dispatch and Management Regulation: 
 http://www.nea.gov.cn/2012-01/04/c_131262812.htm 
16 2019 South China Regional Power Market Annual Report: 
https://www.gzpec.cn/main/indexnew.do?method=load&INFOID=1232074672025440&INFOTYPE=3 
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generation companies and grid companies to connect with each other and follow the uniform 
dispatch rules. The background to such a provision is that when the Electricity Law was enacted, 
uniform nationwide grid connection was not yet established and many independent power 
producers were not connected with the main grid.  China has now built a national interconnected 
power grid through Ultra High Voltage connections. It is therefore possible to create a wider area 
system operation.  The future amendment of the Electricity Law needs to include provisions 
that encourage interprovincial trading through wider area power market arrangements.  
 
(4) privatisation of monopolies. 
 
Monopoly state ownership has resulted in many inefficiency problems such as arbitrary 
administrative inference, corruption etc (Newbery, 2002). Privatisation or part-privatisation of 
state-owned companies generally sets up a long run dynamic which will force state-owned 
companies to improve their performance and be subject to external pressure from competitors 
and anti-trust authorities. Many leading reform countries usually break up monopolistic power 
companies and privatise them separately. In Great Britain, the privatised firms created out of the 
CEGB (which previously monopolised both generation and transmission in England and Wales) 
experienced substantial efficiency improvement (see Newbery and Pollitt, 1997).  
 
There is no provision about ownership arrangements in Energy Law draft. Article 14 only states 
that ‘Investors engaged in energy development and utilization activities should engage in fair 
competition, and their legitimate rights and interests should be protected by law’. This implies that 
a private company can get more involved in the public ownership dominated energy sector. As 
renewable energy experienced fast growth in recent years, private investment accounts for a 
higher portion of the overall investment portfolio than before (Zeng, et al., 2014). But this only 
has a marginal impact. Some of the coal generation plants are suffering big losses at the moment 
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(mid-2020) and face the prolonged risk of insolvency17. Therefore, there is a good opportunity to 
privatize some of these generation assets to find out what would happen after privatization and 
as a prelude for further privatization. For the Energy Law, it is important to create a level 
playing field and ensure that private investors get fair treatment compared to their 
publicly owned peers and to leave the open possibility of privatizing some coal generators 
on the brink of insolvency. 
 
For decades, the foreign investment access restriction regime in China was based on a Foreign 
Investment Industrial Guidance Catalogue jointly issued by the NDRC and Ministry of 
Commerce(MOFCOM). The latest version was published in 2019 (the 2019 Catalogue)18. Foreign 
investment activities are divided into three categories: ‘encouraged activities’, ‘restricted 
activities’ and ‘prohibited activities’. Any activity or sector not listed in the catalogue is ‘permitted’. 
Those falling in the ‘encouraged’ category benefit from streamlined approval procedures, tax 
breaks and other incentives. 
 
On 15 March 2019, the long-expected Foreign Investment Law was passed at the National 
People’s Congress19. The law aims to provide a level playing field for foreign investment into China, 
including in particular the treatment of foreign investors as domestic peers in all business 
activities other than those specifically set out in the Foreign Investment Negative List. This List 
has replaced the restricted and prohibited activities from the Foreign Investment Industrial 
Guidance Catalogue. Any business investment not on the Negative list is deemed as permitted. 
Table 3 summarizes the evolution of guidelines for foreign investors in the electricity sector since 
2015. In 2015, foreign ownership of small scale coal generation under a certain capacity level is 
 
17 The generation plants located in Gansu and Yunnan province applied for insolvency. 
http://www.chinapower.com.cn/moments/20190628/1279528.html 
http://www.chinapower.com.cn/fdcj/20191115/1290481.html 
18 Sector Catalogue that is encouraged for Foreign Investment (2019 version): 
http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2019-06/30/content_5404701.htm 
19 The Foreign Investment Law:  
http://www.chinalaw.gov.cn/Department/content/2019-03/18/592_230773.html 
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prohibited. Meanwhile, nuclear generation and electricity grid investment projects should have 
the majority of shares held by Chinese (mainly public) investors. In 2017, the prohibition on small 
scale coal generation was lifted, while foreign investors can have the majority share in private 
electricity network businesses from 2018. In 2019 flexible generation (such as pumped-storage) 
and energy efficiency projects such as trigeneration emerged as encouraged foreign investment, 
but nuclear generation investment was still subject to Chinese majority share holding restrictions. 
 
Table 3 Different Guidelines for Foreign Investment in Electricity Sector since 2015 
 2015 2017 2018 2019 
Ultra-Super Critical Coal 
Generation Unit with 
Capacity over 600MW 
    
Coal Generation Unit with 
Capacity below 300MW      
Combined Heat and Power 
Generation Unit with 
Capacity over 300MW 
    
Combined Heat and Power 
Generation Unit with 
Capacity over 200MW 
    
Air-Cooled Coal 
Generation Unit with 
Capacity over 600MW in 
Water Scarcity Area 
    
Integrated Gasification 
Combined Cycle Coal 
Generation Unit 
    
Generation Unit equipped 
with Circulating Fluidized 
Bed Boiler Burning Coal 
Gangue or Coal Slurry 
with Capacity over 
300MW 
    
Large Scale Hydro 
Generation     
Pumped-storage 
Generation     
Nuclear Generation     
Renewable Energy 
including Solar, Wind, 
Geothermal, Tidal and 
Biomass 
    
Peaker Generation and 
Distributed Generation 
with Guaranteed Natural 
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Gas Supply Located in 
Load Centre 
Renewable Generation 
Complemented with Gas 
Generation 
    
Electricity Grid     
Combined Cooling Heating 
and Power Utilizing 
Natural Gas, Electricity 
and Renewables 
    
Source: the administrative order by NDRC and MOFCOM20. 
 :Encouraged; : No mention; : Majority holding by Chinese; : Prohibited. 
 
The latest Foreign Investment Negative List published according to the Foreign Investment 
Law has cleared the way for the foreign investors to enter most electricity subsectors, thus 
creating the opportunity to privatize part of China’s electricity industry. The relevant 
government agencies need to further promote a level playing field for both domestic and 
foreign players. 
 
(5-6) creation of spot and ancillary services markets to support real time balancing of the 
system; participation of demand-side in wholesale electricity markets. 
 
The real time balancing of the modern power system requires careful power market design that 
is different from other commodity markets. A complete set of power markets involves a spot 
market to balance energy supply and demand and also ancillary markets for frequency response, 
reactive power, voltage regulation and reserve capacity (Stoft, 2002). The spot market price may 
surge to a high level when system demand reaches the total generation capacity limit. Demand-
side response and reserve capacity markets are low-cost ways to balance the system and curb 
 
20 Foreign Investment Sector Catalogue Guidance (2015 version): 
https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/xxgk/zcfb/fzggwl/201503/t20150313_960793.html 
Foreign Investment Sector Catalogue Guidance (2017 version): 
https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/xxgk/zcfb/fzggwl/201706/t20170628_960838.html 
Foreign Investment Negative List (2018 version): 
https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/xxgk/zcfb/fzggwl/201806/t20180628_960861.html 
Sector Catalogue that is encouraged for Foreign Investment (2019 version): 
http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2019-06/30/content_5404701.htm 
Foreign Investment Negative List (2019 version): 
https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/xxgk/zcfb/fzggwl/201806/t20180628_960861.html 
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potential price hikes. Both the US and Great Britain have introduced demand-side participation 
and reserve markets to complement their spot energy markets (Khalid, 2016). 
 
Regarding the characteristics of different fuel sources, the Draft Energy Law makes provision that 
each energy submarket (coal, electricity, oil, natural gas, etc) should have its own market 
development targets.  But it does not include any specific provision for the power market. The 
current Electricity Law also does not have any provision for spot markets. Nearly all the provinces 
have engaged in electricity long term trading and eight of them have been chosen to begin spot 
market pilots, while many provinces also engage in ancillary service market pilots to cope with 
the curtailment of renewable energy (China Electricity Council,2020; Yuan and Xi,2020). Energy 
Laws must catch up with actual reform progress. The high-level Energy Law has already 
acknowledged the market reform principle. It is, therefore, necessary to include more 
detailed provisions for spot and ancillary service markets in a future Electricity Law. 
 
Unlike deindustrialised economies such as the US and the UK, China’s high proportion of 
industrial load suggests a high potential for demand response. Traditionally Chinese energy policy 
has focussed on the supply side but ignored demand-side response (Zhou and Yang, 2015). The 
chapter on electricity supply and consumption in the Electricity Law only involves the obligation 
of the grid companies for uninterrupted supply to customers, and customers are obligated to 
follow safety regulations and pay their electricity bills. Regarding the indispensable role of 
demand-side participation, it is imperative to give some guidelines in a new Electricity Law 
to facilitate future demand side participation in spot market. 
 
(7) regulated third party access to, and efficient allocation of scarce transmission capacity. 
 
Transmission capacity is a scarce resource for developing countries whose electricity demand 
growth rate often surpasses the speed of network construction. How to allocate transmission 
capacity when the power network is congested needs to be carefully designed (Hogan, 1992). 
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From the experience of reformed countries, allocating transmission capacity on a market basis 
can provide signals for efficient utilization by generators and loads. There are two approaches to 
allocate transmission capacities. The first one is locational marginal pricing which generates 
different prices at different nodes in the power system considering local demand and supply 
(Bohn, et al., 1984). The second one is allocating transmission cost by location such that different 
generators pay individualized use of system charges. Besides that, the allocation of capacity 
among generators and loads should be non-discriminatory between incumbents and entrants 
(Pollitt, 2004).  
 
Article 53 of the Draft Energy Law makes clear that there should be open access to third parties 
on non-discriminatory terms. However, an efficient network capacity allocation mechanism is still 
missing in China. The network charge is all paid by the customers and is usually a uniform price 
for each province regardless of location21 . The provision of Draft Energy Law indicates that 
transmission constraints may be alleviated by increasing transmission capacity (Article 15). This 
is not always a cost-effective way for transmission capacity allocation and often not compatible 
with market reform objectives. The Energy Law draft should modify its provisions to promote 
the general efficient pricing principle for energy transmission.  Meanwhile, a new 
Electricity Law should include more detailed guidelines for efficient power transmission 
capacity allocation, which can be learnt from international best practice. 
 
(9) mechanisms to ensure competitive procurement of wholesale power for regulated final 
customer groups. 
 
Customers who are on regulated final tariffs need to be supplied with wholesale power, which can 
be procured on a competitive basis rather than on a regulated basis. This could signal the real 
wholesale cost to regulated customers and also help to identify how much subsidy regulated 
 
21 The Pricing Method of Provincial Electricity Transmission and Distribution Network 
https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/xxgk/zcfb/ghxwj/202002/t20200205_1219961.html 
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customers receive. In Italy, residential customers pay a default mark-up on wholesale cost while 
the wholesale cost element of default service customers is determined by auction in the US 
(Littlechild, 2008; IEA, 2016). 
China traditionally suppresses the regulated price for residential customers at the expense of 
industrial and commercial customers. Article 58 of the Energy Law states that there should be a 
compensation scheme for the energy company to fulfil the universal service obligation of cross-
subsidy for household supply. The No.9 document also excludes residential customers from 
power market. However this is unnecessary. In the short run, the energy regulator could specify 
the basis of the short term contract for procuring bulk power for residential customers, at the 
same time as requiring a fixed retail price for the regulated final customers. In the long run, a 
special fund could be set up to cover the potential financial losses due to the difference between 
the wholesale price and the fixed regulated retail price. Thus the Energy Law should encourage 
all demand to participate in the wholesale market and have a proper reimbursement 
mechanism to stabilise the regulated price charged to final consumers who are not 
exposed to wholesale market prices.   
 
(10) the creation of independent regulatory agencies to regulate monopoly network charges 
and monitor competitive segments. 
 
Liberalised electricity markets created from incumbent monopolies are vulnerable to anti-
competitive behaviour. The high-frequency transactions in the spot market make it hard for the 
general competition authority to keep a close eye on the state of competition. The network charge 
of transmission and distribution still needs to be regulated by a public agency. These are reasons 
for the establishment of a dedicated regulatory agency even after the whole sector is deregulated 
(Besant-Jones, 2006). The regulatory agency should be independent enough to protect it from the 
central government’s arbitrary intervention in order to avoid government appropriation of 
investors’ assets. Independent regulation coupled with private ownership can provide a credible 
commitment to reasonable investment returns. Otherwise, the government may force private 
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firms to reduce electricity prices after irreversible investments have been made (Gilbert and 
Newbery, 1994). Independent regulation in Great Britain plays an important role in protecting 
competition in the power market and investment incentives for network businesses. The GB 
regulator, Ofgem (together with its predecessor Offer), is a non-minister government department 
which is kept an arm’s length from the energy ministry. Working with the Competition Authority, 
it facilitated the break-up of the duopolistic generators who manipulated the power pool in the 
early years of reform and oversaw significant new investment in the sector following privatisation 
(Newbery, 2005). 
 
In the Energy Law draft, there is no statement about an independent regulatory agency. Article 
16 grants the Energy Department of the State Council the authority to supervise and manage 
national energy development but does not make it clear what it has to do with regulatory tasks. 
Article 66 states the Price Department of the State Council sets the price of natural monopoly 
segments in the energy sector. Figure 2 depicts the relationship between these two departments. 
The Energy Department means the NEA and the Price Department means Department of Price of 
the NDRC. 
Figure 2 Sketch of Organization Chart of NDRC and NEA 









Gilbert and Newbery(1994)distinguished two regimes regarding ownership and regulation. The 
first one is public ownership with administrative interference, the second one is private 
ownership with independent regulation. Private ownership can boost efficiency but requires 
independent regulation to assure investment incentives. The state ownership arrangement leaves 
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the scope for administrative intervention to achieve a lower price. From 2018 to 2020, the State 
Council’s annual ‘Work Report’ presented to the National People’s Congress has proposed 
electricity price cut for small and medium industrial and commercial customers by 10% in first 
two years and 5% in 2020. Most of the cost burden of such a policy falls on the shoulders of state-
owned grid companies (Xie, et al., 2020). Regarding the close connection between private 
ownership and independent regulation, the Energy Law should allow for a whole policy 
package of privatization and independent regulation. Although public ownership and 
government intervention can keep the electricity price at a low level, this is surely not 
sustainable for the vast Chinese electricity system in the longer run. 
 
 
(11) competitive procurement processes for low carbon generation, with some exposure to 
wholesale price variability. 
 
Two reasons make low carbon generation deserve government subsidy: its technological infancy 
relative to mature fossil fuel generation and its positive environmental externalities (Grubb, et al., 
2008). But it still should be exposed to the competitive wholesale market to give it the incentive 
to respond to supply and demand factors. That means that renewable energy would receive a 
variable price that closely depends on the spot market price rather than a fixed price. A common 
method for this is Tradable Green Certificates (TGCs). The energy suppliers must buy enough 
TGCs from renewable generators to fulfil their legally predetermined minimum ratio of renewable 
consumption (Currier, 2013).  
Various articles of the Energy Law draft give high priority to the development of low carbon 
generation (Articles 14,18,32 and 43) and there is a section in chapter 3 dedicated to non-fossil 
fuel energy. But there is no explicit provision for subsidies to renewable energy. Nonetheless, the 
Renewable Energy Law introduces Feed-in tariffs for solar and wind energy. The Renewable 
Energy Development Fund is established according to the Renewable Energy Law to subsidize 
renewables. Due to the rapid development of wind and solar, the Renewable Energy Development 
   
 
   
 
27
Fund was quickly depleted by mounting renewable capacities22. So, the Feed-in tariff is no longer 
sustainable. China has decided to shift to a renewable energy portfolio standard regime23.  This is 
echoed in Article 45 of Energy Law which says the state will set targets for minimum renewable 
energy consumption for each province and that those market participants who have not reached 
the minimum target should buy TGCs from those who have a surplus in order to fulfil their 
obligation. 
 
There is no explicit provision about low carbon generation participating in the wholesale market. 
There is only competitive procurement for the investment and construction of new wind and solar 
projects. New wind and solar projects are paid fixed prices which are determined by this 
competitive procurement24 . But they are still not exposed to wholesale price volatility. It is 
desirable to include renewable sources in the spot market in any future amendment of the 
Electricity Law and government subsidy should be based on a market compatible regime. 
 
(12) cost reflective access terms for renewables. 
 
The dilemma for cost-reflective renewable grid connection charges is that it would penalize 
renewable sources whose underlying resource is favourable but far from load centres. Most 
countries – which are much smaller than China - are paying the same price to renewable sources 
regardless of their location. But some jurisdictions have tried different ways forward. In Great 
Britain, part of system upgrade cost (shallows connection cost) is paid by renewable sources, 
while the Flexible Plug and Play project allows renewables to avoid such cost at the expense of 
increased interruption (Anaya and Pollitt, 2015). 
 
 
22  National People’s Congress: The inquiry report of the Renewable Energy Law implementation 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/c30834/201912/2b7568de01944c33b9326c325dcd498f.shtml 
23  The notice of establishing minimal consumption ratio of renewable power for every province 
http://zfxxgk.nea.gov.cn/auto87/201905/t20190515_3662.htm 
24 The list of solar generation sites with its subsidized generation price 
http://zfxxgk.nea.gov.cn/2020-06/23/c_139172930.htm 
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In China, Article 48 of the Energy Law draft makes it clear that the connection cost of renewable 
energy fully shifts to the grid company:‘…Grid enterprises should strengthen the construction of 
power grids, expand the scope of renewable energy allocation, develop smart grids and energy 
storage technologies, and establish energy-saving and low-carbon power dispatching operation 
systems.’ 
 
Since the additional costs of connecting remote renewable sources are paid by the grid company 
and fully compensated under cost-plus regulation of the network charge, renewable generators 
do not face any locational signals. The provision of Article 48 fails to recognize that the expansion 
of power grids, smart grids and storage capacity compete with each other. This article could be 
revised so that renewables bear some portion of the cost incurred by the grid company for 
the accommodation of renewables. In the meantime, the state should encourage grid 
companies and renewable producers to adopt more cost-effective options for connection. 
 
(13) Appropriate pricing of environmental externalities (both carbon dioxide and other 
atmospheric pollutants, such as sulphur dioxide).  
 
Power generation from fossil fuels inevitably produces various environmental pollution. Pollution 
taxes, permit schemes and legal liability for damage can all be used to efficiently price the external 
costs of such pollution. The US sulphur permit system and the RECLAIM scheme in Southern 
California have successfully reduced SO2 and NOx (Ellerman, 2004; Fowlie, et al., 2012). The EU 
Emissions Trading Scheme in the EU also supports the decarbonization of the power sector.  
The Energy Law draft sets out the general principle that energy producers and customers should 
reduce pollution and Greenhouse Gas emissions. Due to the division of relevant Laws, the relevant 
environment protection provisions are included in the environment law system. The 
Environment Protection Law was enacted in 1989 and amended in 2014. It is the basic law in the 
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environment domain.25 The Environment Protection Tax Law, enacted in 2016 and amended in 
2018, imposes taxes for SO2 and NOx emissions.26 The Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law 
enacted in 1987 and amended in 2015 promotes pollution permit trading for key air pollutants27. 
Emissions trading dates back to 1994 and proliferated nationally in 2014 (Chang and Wang, 2010; 
Ye, et al., 2020). Relevant research finds that the SO2 emissions trading pilots have played an 
important role in pollution abatement(Wu, et al., 2019). Carbon emissions trading is being 
extended from large scale pilots to a national scheme(Lin and Jia, 2019). 
 
The legislative progress on appropriate pricing of environmental externalities is not uniform. The 
polluters were obliged to pay an emissions levy by the tentative version of the Environment 
Protection Law enacted in 197928. The Environment Protection Tax Law enacted in 2018 just 
replaced the relevant provisions of the emissions levy. There are only policy documents but no 
laws for pollution and the pilot carbon emissions trading arrangements29. The national carbon 
emissions permit trading market is currently delayed due to the huge regional differences in 
China. The provincial governments are worried about the dampening of local economic 
growth(Lo, 2012). China should take a more proactive attitude towards appropriate pricing 
of environmental externalities and push forward a national carbon emissions permit 
market based on the experience of existing pilots. 
 
25 The Environment Protection Law 2014 
http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2014-04/25/content_2666328.htm 
26 The Environment Protection Tax Law 2018 
http://www.mee.gov.cn/ywgz/fgbz/fl/201811/t20181114_673632.shtml 
27 The Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law 2018 
http://www.mee.gov.cn/ywgz/fgbz/fl/201811/t20181113_673567.shtml 
28 The Environment Protection Law (Tentative) 1979 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/gongbao/2000-12/10/content_5004381.htm 
The Tentative Charging Method of Pollution Emission Levy 1982 (repealed) 
http://www.pkulaw.cn/fulltext_form.aspx?Db=chl&Gid=03e530f39af83eacbdfb 
29 The Guiding Notice of Further Proliferate Pollution Emission Permit Auction and Trading 2014 
http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2014-08/25/content_9050.htm 
The Carbon Emission Trade Administration Provisional Regulation (Public Consultation) 2019 
http://www.mee.gov.cn/hdjl/yjzj/wqzj_1/201904/t20190403_698483.shtml 
   
 




The newly published Energy Law draft has incorporated many of the reform principles in the No.9 
document and will set the legal framework for future electricity reform. After giving a summary 
of the Energy Law draft and its legislative background, this paper has suggested some potential 
improvements in the Energy Law as currently drafted, as well as suggesting some possible future 
amendments to the current Electricity Law and Renewable Energy law. These are summarized in 
Table 4. 
Table 4 Legal support and Suggestions for the Energy Law draft 





Vertical separation of 
competitive elements 
(generation and retail) 
from natural monopoly 
networks. 
Partly support for 






restructuring of generation 
to create a competitive 
wholesale market. 
Lack of support Strict antitrust 
scrutiny of horizontal 
merger by 
coordination with the 
Antimonopoly Law. 
Unbundling of regulated 
network charges and 
competitive segment 
charges. 
Adequate support  General guidance of 
incentive regulation 
for network charges. 
Creation of wide-area 
independent system 
operators. 
Lack of support due to 
its specific to the 
electricity sector  
Merit order based 
economic dispatch and 
wider power market 
geographical scope for 
the Electricity Law. 
Privatisation of monopolies Lack of support Create a level playing 
field, privatizing some 
coal generators on the 
brink of insolvency, 






Creation of spot and 
ancillary services markets 
to support the real-time 
balancing of the system. 
Partly support due to 
its specific to the 
electricity sector. 
Detailed provisions 
for spot and ancillary 
service markets for 
the Electricity Law. 
Participation of demand-
side in wholesale 
electricity markets. 
Lack of support Facilitate future 
demand side 
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participation for the 
Electricity Law. 
Regulated third party 
access  
Adequate support  
Efficient allocation of 
scarce transmission 
capacity 
Lack of support General efficient 





Mechanisms to ensure 
competitive procurement of 
wholesale power for 
regulated final customer 
groups. 
Lack of support Encourage all demand 
to participate in the 
wholesale market. 
Creation of independent 
regulatory agencies to 
regulate monopoly network 
charges and monitor 
competitive segments. 










processes for low carbon 
generation, with some 






sources in the spot 
market. 
Cost reflective access 
terms for renewables. 
Lack of support Renewables to bear a 
portion of the grid 
connection cost. 
Appropriate pricing of 
environmental 
externalities (both carbon 
dioxide and other 
atmospheric pollutants, 
such as sulphur dioxide). 
Adequate support by 
the Environment 
Laws 
Push forward national 




A clear positive aspect of the Energy Law draft is its support for market-oriented reform in the 
energy sector. However, as we have suggested many provisions can be improved based on 
international experience. The final version of the Energy Law could: create a competitive 
horizontal market structure with the use of the Antimonopoly Law; incorporate the 
principle of a market mechanism for allocating transmission capacity; apply incentive 
regulation to regulated energy network companies; create a level playing field for both 
private and foreign investors; put the regulated customers’ demand in the wholesale 
market and reimburse the revenue potential losses; establish an independent regulatory 
institution as a credible commitment to the promotion of private investment incentives; 
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encourage grid companies and renewable producers to adopt the most cost-effective 
options for connection; and make more use of the pricing of environmental externalities. 
 
The Electricity Law should also be updated once the Energy Law comes into force. The difference 
between the Electricity Law and the Energy Law is that the former can be more detailed and 
specific to electricity. A new Electricity Law could: make specific provisions for unbundling 
the transmission, distribution and retail businesses of the Grid companies; underpin a 
comprehensive move towards merit order based economic dispatch; encourage 
interprovincial trading through wide-area power market arrangements; include detailed 
provisions for spot and ancillary markets and efficient power transmission capacity 
allocation; and facilitate the participation of demand-side and renewable sources in the 
spot market. 
 
The Renewable Law also needs to be updated so that renewable subsidies are based on a 
market compatible regime. Meanwhile, renewable energy needs to bear some portion of 
the grid connection cost. With respect to Environmental Laws, it is time to push forward 
with the national carbon emission permit market based on the experience of the existing 
carbon pilots. 
 
At present, the 2020 Draft Energy Law is not on the legislative plan to be considered by the current 
session of the National People’s Congress Standing Committee (2018-2023), but it is on the 
subordinate list of draft legislation that will be “submitted for deliberation once conditions 
become mature”30.  As we discussed above, the Draft Energy Law has highlighted many important 
aspects of China’s future energy reforms. With ongoing reforms taking place there is a need for 
China to complete the updating of its energy law system. 
 
30 The Legislative Plan for the 13th session of the National People’s Congress Standing Committee 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/c30834/201809/f9bff485a57f498e8d5e22e0b56740f6.shtml 
   
 




References [in English] 
Anaya, K. L. and Pollitt, M. G., 2015. Options for allocating and releasing distribution system 
capacity: Deciding between interruptible connections and firm DG connections. Applied 
Energy. 144, 96-105. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2015.01.043 
Andrews-Speed, P. and Dow, S., 2000. Reform of China's electric power industry Challenges facing 
the government. Energy Policy. 28(5), 335-347. 
https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/S0301-4215(00)00034-3 
Besant-Jones, J. Reforming power markets in developing countries: what have we learned? World 
Bank Washington, DC, 2006. 
Bohn, R. E., Caramanis, M. C. and Schweppe, F. C., 1984. Optimal pricing in electrical networks 
over space and time. The Rand Journal of Economics. 15(3), 360-376.  
Chang, Y. and Wang, N., 2010. Environmental regulations and emissions trading in China. Energy 
Policy. 38(7), 3356-3364. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2010.02.006 
Currier, K. M., 2013. A regulatory adjustment process for the determination of the optimal 
percentage requirement in an electricity market with Tradable Green Certificates. Energy 
Policy. 62, 1053-1057. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2013.07.032 
Davidson, M. R. and Pérez-Arriaga, I., 2020. Avoiding Pitfalls in China's Electricity Sector Reforms. 
The Energy journal. 41(3). https://doi.org/10.5547/01956574.41.3.mdav 
Ellerman, D., 2004. The U.S. cap-and-trade programme, in: OECD (Eds.), Tradeable Permits Policy 
Evaluation, Design and Reform. OECD Publishing. 
Fowlie, M., Holland, S. P. and Mansur, E. T., 2012. What Do Emissions Markets Deliver and to 
Whom? Evidence from Southern California's NOx Trading Program. American Economic 
Review. 102(2), 965-993. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.102.2.965 
Gilbert, R. J. and Newbery, D. M., 1994. The Dynamic Efficiency of Regulatory Constitutions. The 
Rand journal of economics. 25(4), 538-554. https://doi.org/10.2307/2555974 
Gilbert, R. and Newbery, D. M., 1994. International Comparisons of Electricity Regulation. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Green, R. J. and Newbery, D. M., 1992. Competition in the British Electricity Spot Market. Journal 
of Political Economy. 100(5), 929-953.  
Grubb, M., Jamasb, T. and Pollitt, M. G., 2008. Delivering a low carbon electricity system: 
technologies, economics and policy. Cambridge University Press. 
Hogan, W. W., 1992. Contract networks for electric power transmission. Journal of Regulatory 
Economics. 4(3), 211-242. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00133621 
IEA. 2016. Energy Policies of IEA Countries: Italy 2016 Review.  https://webstore.iea.org/energy-
policies-of-iea-countries-italy-2016-review 
Jamasb, T. and Pollitt, M., 2007. Incentive regulation of electricity distribution networks: Lessons 
of experience from Britain. Energy Policy. 35(12), 6163-6187. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2007.06.022 
Khalid, O. 2016. Exploring the market for demand-side response. 13 May 2016 Spring Seminar.  
http://www.eprg.group.cam.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/O.Khalid.pdf 
Li, S., Zhang, S. and Andrews-Speed, P., 2019. Using diverse market-based approaches to integrate 
renewable energy: Experiences from China. Energy Policy. 125, 330-337. 
https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2018.11.006 
Lin, B. and Jia, Z., 2019. What will China's carbon emission trading market affect with only 
electricity sector involvement? A CGE based study. Energy Economics. 78, 301-311. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2018.11.030 
   
 
   
 
34
Lin, K. and Purra, M. M., 2019. Transforming China's electricity sector: Politics of institutional 
change and regulation. Energy Policy. 124, 401-410. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2018.07.041 
Littlechild, S., 2008. Municipal aggregation and retail competition in the Ohio energy sector. 
Journal of Regulatory Economics. 34(2), 164-194. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11149-008-9067-
y 
Liu, X., Pollitt, M. G., Xie, B. and Liu, L., 2019. Does environmental heterogeneity affect the 
productive efficiency of grid utilities in China? Energy Economics. 83, 333-344. 
https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2019.07.001 
Lo, A., 2012. Carbon emissions trading in China. Nature Climate Change. 2(11), 765-766.  
Ma, C. and He, L., 2008. From state monopoly to renewable portfolio: Restructuring China's 
electric utility. Energy Policy. 36(5), 1697-1711. 
https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2008.01.012 
Mansur, E. T. and White, M. W. 2012. Market organization and efficiency in electricity markets.  
http://www.dartmouth.edu/~mansur/papers/mansur_white_pjmaep.pdf 
Newbery, D. M., 2002. Privatization, restructuring, and regulation of network utilities. MIT press. 
Newbery, D. M., 2005. Electricity liberalisation in Britain: The quest for a satisfactory wholesale 
market design. The Energy Journal. 26, 43-70.  
Newbery, D. M. and Pollitt, M., 1997. The Restructuring and Privatisation of Britain's CEGB—Was 
It Worth It? The Journal of Industrial Economics. 45(3), 269-303. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-6451.00049 
Pollitt, M., 2004. Electricity reform in Chile-lessons for developing countries. Journal of Network 
Industry. 5(3-4), 221-262.  
Pollitt, M., 2008. The arguments for and against ownership unbundling of energy transmission 
networks. Energy Policy. 36(2), 704-713. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2007.10.011 
Pollitt, M., 2019. The European Single Market in Electricity: An Economic Assessment. Review of 
Industrial Organization. 55(1), 63-87. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-019-09682-w 
Pollitt, M., 2020. Reforming the Chinese Electricity Supply Sector: Lessons from Global Experience. 
Palgrave Macmillan, London. 
Pollitt, M., Yang, C. and Chen, H. 2017. Reforming the Chinese Electricity Supply Sector: Lessons 
from International Experience. University of Cambridge Energy Policy Research Group.  
https://www.eprg.group.cam.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/1704-Text.pdf 
Qiu, X. and Li, H., 2012. Energy Regulation and Legislation in China. Environmental Law Reporter 
News & Analysis. 42(7), 10678-10693.  
Sioshansi, F. P. and Pfaffenberger, W., 2006. Electricity market reform: an international 
perspective. Elsevier. 
Stoft, S., 2002. Power System Economics——Designing Markets for Electricity. IEEE Press, 
Piscataway,NJ. 
Wu, X., Gao, M., Guo, S. and Maqbool, R., 2019. Environmental and economic effects of sulfur 
dioxide emissions trading pilot scheme in China: A quasi-experiment. Energy & Environment. 
30(7), 1255-1274. https://doi.org/10.1177/0958305X19843104 
Xie, B., Xu, J. and Pollitt, M. 2020. What effect has the 2015 power market reform had on power 
prices in China? Evidence from Guangdong and Zhejiang. Energy Policy Research Group, 
University of Cambridge.  https://www.eprg.group.cam.ac.uk/eprg-working-paper-2010/ 
Xu, Y., 2017. Sinews of Power: The Politics of the State Grid Corporation of China. Oxford 
University Press, Oxford. 
   
 
   
 
35
Ye, W., Liu, L. and Zhang, B., 2020. Designing and implementing pollutant emissions trading 
systems in China: A twelve-year reflection. Journal of Environmental Management. 261, 
110207. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvman.2020.110207 
Yu, X., 2010. An overview of legislative and institutional approaches to China's energy 
development. Energy Policy. 38(5), 2161-2167. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2009.06.004 
Zeng, M., Liu, X., Li, Y. and Peng, L., 2014. Review of renewable energy investment and financing 
in China: Status, mode, issues and countermeasures. Renewable and Sustainable Energy 
Reviews. 31, 23-37. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2013.11.026 
Zhang, S., Andrews-Speed, P. and Li, S., 2018. To what extent will China's ongoing electricity 
market reforms assist the integration of renewable energy? Energy Policy. 114, 165-172. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2017.12.002 
Zhou, K. and Yang, S., 2015. Demand side management in China: The context of China’s power 




China Communist Party and China State Council, 2015. "关于进一步深化电力体制改革的若干
意见 ". Some Opinions of Deepening Reform of the Power Sector, Document No.9. 
https://www.ne21.com/news/show-64828.html (accessed 24 June 2020)  (In Chinese). 
China Electricity Council, 2020. "2019年12月全国电力市场交易信息". China Power Market 
Trade Information in December 2010. 
http://www.cec.org.cn/guihuayutongji/dianligaige/2020-01-21/197071.html (accessed 24 
June 2020)  (In Chinese). 
China State Council, 2002. "国务院关于印发电力体制改革方案的通知". Programme on Reform 
of Power Sector, Document No.5. http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2017-
09/13/content_5223177.htm (accessed 24 June 2020)  (In Chinese). 
Luo, G., 1993. "关于国务院机构改革方案的说明  (1993年)". The explanation of ministerial 
agency reform of the State Council. 
https://zh.wikisource.org/wiki/%E5%85%B3%E4%BA%8E%E5%9B%BD%E5%8A%A1%E9%99
%A2%E6%9C%BA%E6%9E%84%E6%94%B9%E9%9D%A9%E6%96%B9%E6%A1%88%E7%9A%
84%E8%AF%B4%E6%98%8E_(1993%E5%B9%B4) (accessed 31 August 2020)  (In Chinese). 
Lv, Z. 2014. "能源法导论".An Introduction of Energy Law. China Electric Power Press, Beijing. (In 
Chinese) 
Tan, R. and Zhao, G. 2016. "中国能源监管的探索与实践".The Probe and Practice of China Energy 
Regulation. People's Publishing House, Beijing. (In Chinese) 
Wu, Z. (2009). "经验与启示:中国能源法制建设30年". Experience and Enlightenment: the thirty 
years history of China energy legal system establishment. Academic Journal of Zhengzhou 
University, 42(03): 65-67(In Chinese). 
Ye, R. and Wu, Z. 2006. "中国能源法体系研究".Studies on China's Energy Legal Framework. 
China Electric Power Press, Beijing. (In Chinese) 
Yuan, J. and Xi, X. (2020). "我国电力辅助服务市场建设的现状与问题". The statues and problem 
of China electricity ancillary service market. China Power Enterprise Manage(3)(In Chinese). 
Zhang, X. and Ye, R. (2006). "我们需要什么样的《能源法》——访中电联专职顾问、中国法
学会能源法研究会会长叶荣泗". What kind of energy law do we need? interview with Ye 
Rongsi: the Chairman of China Energy Law Research Society. China Power Enterprise 
Management(05): 4-7(In Chinese). 
  
